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A DIRTY RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT (THE FAILURE 
OF ENFORCEMENT IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT) 
Victor B. Flatt* 
On March 15, 1996, the Atlanta Bar Association's Section on 
Environmental Law hosted a presentation concerning the City of 
Atlanta's continuing non-compliance with the terms of its 
NPDESI permit related to municipal sewage treatment dis-
charges. This ongoing problem recently had come to the forefront 
of local news stories,2 and the meeting was heavily attended. 
The story made for good press and hit a responsive chord as 
resentment against the big city of Atlanta found play in its con-
tinuing "unauthorized" pollution of the Chattahoochee River and 
the effect of that pollution on downstream, more rural, neighbors. 
Surprising to most of the public was the information that the state 
Environmental Protection Division (EPD), the Georgia state 
agency charged with administering the NPDES program in Geor-
gia, had not levied the most extensive fines that it could on At-
lanta for the city's violations. The EPD also had not required 
immediate compliance with the permit, even though the problems 
(in this case phosphorous load and combined sewer overflow) had 
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. The author wishes to thank 
Owen Anderson, Fred Cheever, Bradford Mank, Charles Marvin, Joel Mintz, David Moore, 
Zygmunt Plater, Cliff Rechtschaffer, Jack Williams, and all of those who offered helpful com-
ments at the presentation of an earlier draft of this paper at the 1997 AALS conference, Natural 
Resources Panel. The author particularly would like to thank Marjorie Girth and Paul Milich 
for their intensive review of the Article. lowe an enormous debt to my research assistants, 
Karen Armsby and Stan Case, without whose precise attention to detail this data could not have 
been analyzed nor could this article have been written. A special thanks to the Editor in Chief 
ofthe BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, Christopher J. Hunter, and 
to the Executive Editor, Siobhan Mee. Your enthusiasm for the Article made this collaboration 
a joy. 
1 NPDES stands for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 
(1995). 
2 See Staff, 1996 Georgia General Assembly, City Earned Hooch Fines, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Mar. 11, 1996, at AS. 
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existed for several years. 3 
At the time of the presentation, the issue of whether the enforce-
ment actions taken were effective had become quite politicized. 
The Georgia legislature that very week was considering various 
proposals overriding the Georgia EPD's enforcement decision 
and tightening requirements and punishment of Atlanta for its 
perceived lack of zeal in addressing the NPDES violations.4 At 
the March 15, 1996, meeting, Senator Langford of the Georgia 
state legislature rose to his feet and declared that "this time" the 
legislature was serious about stepping in and "doing something" 
because the Georgia EPD was "in the pocket" of the city of At-
lanta.S 
Two years earlier, in 1994, the Georgia EPD released its public 
information document, "Water Quality in Georgia, 1992-93," 
which summarized the actions of the EPD with respect to water 
quality in Georgia during those years.6 In the section on NPDES 
permitting, the report stated: "In 1992-93, a significant amount 
of personnel time was allocated to the reissuance of NPDES 
permits. Permits were reissued for 374 municipal and private 
discharges and for 210 industrial discharges. In contrast to many 
other areas of the nation, Georgia has no backlog of permits to be 
issued."" 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Some call it the "Mississippi syndrome." Others call it the "race to 
the bottom." Whatever the exact term, the concept posits that, if left 
to their own devices, the states invariably will not provide the proper 
regulation needed for their citizens' well-being.8 Specifically, because 
of differential economic development, some states, notably the poor-
est (e.g., Mississippi), will bargain away the long-term health and 
well-being of their citizens for current economic gain.9 Without a 
federally mandated floor, poor states' bargaining power with industry 
3 See Charles Seabrook, Suit Filed to Halt Pollution: Plaintiffs Claim State Agency Can't 
Control, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 11, 1995, at E2. 
4 See id. 
5 Author's notes of Mar. 15, 1996, Atlanta Bar Association meeting (on file with the author). 
6 See GEORGIA ENVTL. PROTECTION DIV., WATER QUALITY IN GEORGIA, 1992-1993. 
7Id. at 19. 
B See Thomas W. Merrill, Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism, and the 
Future of American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 485, 486-87 (1994). 
9 See Jeffrey Geiger, Canary in a Coal Mine? Federalism and the Failure of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 81, 86-87 (1995). 
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may be very limited. As such bargaining becomes commonplace, less 
impoverished states are forced to match some of the incentives of-
fered by the poorer states in order to maintain their comparative 
economic benefits, raising the ante of health giveaways. to This leads 
to a downward spiral at the end of which the economic well-being of 
most states remains unimproved-all states provide a lower standard 
of long-term health and well-being for their citizens, while giving 
away the higher standards in a competitive frenzy to enrich the 
coffers of private interests.l1 Today, the discussion often is about 
either development giveaways, or the lowering of taxes used to fund 
education in order to attract business.12 But in the past, the "race to 
the bottom" conjured up images of polluted water, air, and land.13 
It was the ''race to the bottom" that supposedly explained the 
inability of state legislatures to take steps that would protect their 
own citizens from environmental degradation; the "race to the bot-
tom" also was one of the factors that prompted the major reform in 
United States environmental policy-the federalization of environ-
mental laws and standards.14 In a stunningly quick series of develop-
ments in the late 1960s and early 1970s,16 federal primacy in the 
control of air, water, and toxic waste pollution replaced state pri-
10 See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States fram Themselves: Cammerce Clause Constraints 
on State Thx Incentives for Busi'lU!ss, 110 lIARv. L. REV. 377, 380 (1996). 
11 Of course, these profits may have been eaten up by competition, ultimately allowing cheaper 
consumer goods and services to the public. Some would argue that this offsets the loss of 
long-term health benefits. 
12 See, e.g., Julie Roin, Rethinking Thx 7'reaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Thx 
Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753,1796 (1995). 
18 Later studies have suggested theoretical reasons why the race to the bottom may not be . 
detrimental to a state's health. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Cam petition: 
Rethinking the "Race to the Bottam" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1992); but see Kirsten Engel, State Environmental Standard 
Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom?" 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274-78 (1997). Even 
if commentators such as Revesz are correct in choosing a different label than "race to the 
bottom" and preferring to see healthy competition and comparative advantage with poorer 
states competing in the only ways available, such a view does not change the premise of harmful 
environmental effects from this "comparative advantage competition." Being at the bottom, 
even with a new Daimler-Benz factory, is not necessarily good for state citizens, and certainly 
means that environmental protection may be wanting. 
14 See Geiger, supra note 9, at 84. 
15 Federalization of major pollution problems occurred in less than ten years. Increasing 
federalization of air pollution control occurred in 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 7404 (1994) (history»; increas-
ing federalization of water pollution control occurred in 1972 (33 U .S.C. § 1251 (1994) (history»; 
and increasing federalization of hazardous waste control occurred in 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 6921 
(1994) (history». 
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macy.16 New standards provided a maximum level of pollution for all 
states. The federal model had triumphed. 
According to this new environmental protection paradigm, no citi-
zen of any state would have to suffer environmental degradation 
because of unhealthy competition for environmentally bad business. 
In order to preserve efficiency and flexibility, the states in many in-
stances would be given the opportunity to run their own programs as 
long as pollution curtailment met federal standards.17 Ongoing super-
vision by the federal government was supposed to ensure that the 
states enforced these minimum standards adequately.18 If a state's 
enforcement was inadequate, the federal government could step back 
in and run the program directly.19 In order to preserve flexibility, 
states were supposed to tow the line in enforcement to avoid possible 
draconian enforcement at the hands of the federal government. Fed-
eral supervision of state enforcement seemed like a great idea, fool-
proof in every way. The flexibility of state enforcement would be 
coupled with federal standards and oversight to ensure the adequate 
protection of all citizens. 
But all was not as rosy as it seemed. For a strange thing hap-
pened in the subsequent years. As the responsibility of the federal 
oversight agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
grew, its funds did not.20 This hampered EPA's ability to monitor 
programs adequately. Moreover, without money, the threat of a true 
federal takeover largely disappeared, as the federal government could 
no longer afford the direct control of pollution compliance within most 
states.21 Some results of this oversight breakdown were obvious, such 
as the failure of states to promUlgate water quality standards and the 
failure of EPA to require promulgation of such standards.22 These 
16 See E. Donald Elliott et aI., Thward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization 
of Environmental Law, in AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 68, 71 (Robert L. Fischman 
et al. eds., 1996). 
17 See Geiger, supra note 9, at 85. 
18 See id. at 84-85. 
19 See id. 
20 See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription 
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 2(44)5 
(1987). 
21 See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., EPA and the States: Environmental Challenges Require a 
Better Working Relationship, 11 (Apr. 1995); see also John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism 
under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1190, 1216 (1995) (generalizing about EPA's 
difficulty in taking back state programs due to lack of federal resources); John H. Cushman, Jr., 
EPA Is Canceling Pollution Testing Across the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,1995, at Al. 
22 See Order in Civil Action No. 1-94--CV-2501 MHS, Sierra Club v. Hankinson (N.D. Ga. 
1996) [hereinafter Order] (on file with the author). 
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visible failures provoked the use of citizen suits and commensurate 
relief.23 Other results, such as ineffective "enforcement" actions that 
states took under the National Pollutant Elimination Discharge Sys-
tem (NPDES), were and are less visible. 
Federal supervision of state enforcement was not as fail-safe a 
scheme as its proponents initially believed. The laws and standards 
were still there and they might be enforced with much energy from 
citizens.24 But all the laws on earth do not amount to much if they are 
not enforced, or if the enforcement lacks teeth. With the credible 
threat of a federal takeover removed, the states could go back to, or 
continue, their race to the bottom.25 Yet this time, they did not race 
with the laxity of laws, but with the lack of zeal of enforcement of 
laws-a competition that is much more hidden and insidious, and one 
in which some states may not want to compete.26 
Although lack of zeal of enforcement has been commented upon 
anecdotally for a long time,27 differing enforcement patterns never 
have been proven to exist numerically, and the implications never 
have been analyzed. One of the downsides of the failure to study this 
problem until now has been the proliferation of commentary declaring 
the environmental "race to the bottom" problem dead and claiming 
that states can handle environmental problems.28 The "success" of the 
federal-state partnership in environmental cleanup is supposed to 
substantiate these claims.29 Moreover, the states' "proven" ability to 
withstand the temptation of negative competition leading to environ-
mental degradation is supposed to suggest the conclusion, featured 
prominently in the Republican majority congressional agenda, that 
more responsibility for environmental health should be given to the 
states.30 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 Indeed, consistent enforcement at the federal level also may be problematic due to funding 
cuts. This Article does not address this issue. 
26 Although he does not rely on empirical evidence, Professor David R. Rodas analyzes the 
"competition" of weakened regulatory enforcement in Enforcement of Environmental Law in 
a 'Priangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is 
Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1574-75 
(1995). 
27 See Julie Anne Ross, Comment, Citizen Suits: California's Proposition 65 and the Lawyer's 
Ethical Duty to the Public Interest, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 809, 833 (1995). 
28 See Revesz, supra note 13, at 1233-34. 
29 See generally Geiger, supra note 9, at 113. 
30 See Robert F. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental 
Laws, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2373, 2374 (1996). For a discussion of the rationale for state enforcement, 
see generally id. at 2381-85. 
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This Article challenges that conclusion and gives support to the 
anecdotal evidence of enforcement failure by looking at enforcement 
patterns in a consistent manner for one major federal environmental 
law, the CWA.31 This Article reviews the requirements and the impli-
cations for uniform pollution control of the CWA, and then empirically 
analyzes the enforcement patterns of two medium-sized states, Geor-
gia and Washington, which both have permission to administer pro-
grams and permitting under the CWNs NPDES program.32 The sta-
tistical analysis proves that even when source differences are taken 
into account, the stringency of enforcement between the states is dif-
ferent, leading to the conclusion that neither uniform national stand-
ards, nor effective enforcement of at least one major environmental 
law exists.33 As this Article makes clear, the states have not changed 
in their ability to enforce environmental standards rigorously on their 
own; any assertion to the contrary is at best wishful thinking, and at 
worst deliberate propaganda. Sadly, state flexibility represents not 
only the promise of efficiency in environmental protection, but the 
reality of health giveaways in the name of comparative advantage. 
The perception of the Georgia state legislator at the Bar Associa-
tion meeting that the Georgia EPD was too cozy and flexible with 
Atlanta concerning its NPDES violations is not just an interesting 
anecdote; it represents a true picture of what is happening in our 
nation. Federal laws are not protecting the environment or human 
health because states do not enforce the laws uniformly. A dirty river 
runs through the clean promise of our environmental laws, and that 
river is inadequate state enforcement. True environmental protection 
awaits the ability to address this problem effectively. More federal 
enforcement is needed, not less. Evidence indicates that further devo-
lution of power to the states merely will intensify the lack of environ-
mental protection, whereas increased federal enforcement may pro-
vide the hammer that is needed to get the states back on track.34 
31 After the 1972 amendments, the national scheme to control water pollution was called the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. At the time of the 1977 amendments, the name was 
changed to the current Clean Water Act, the term used throughout this Article. 
32 See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.260; Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper v. City of Atlanta, 
953 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-20 et seq. (Michie 1996». 
33 See infra Parts III and IV. 
34 See infra Part IV. 
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II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND ITS INTENTIONS FOR UNIFORM, 
STRINGENT ENFORCEMENT 
A. Clean Water Act: Background and History 
When Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act, CWA, or 1972 Amendments), 
the stated objective was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."35 The ever-mount-
ing pollution resulting from the industrial revolution and the increas-
ing urban population largely had gone unchecked, despite repeated 
efforts to address the problem.36 Among the early congressional 
schemes dealing with water pollution were the Refuse Act of 189937 
and the Water Quality Act of 1948.38 Ambient water quality standards 
were created in 1965, with the understanding that the states would 
implement the necessary steps to meet the standards.39 Nevertheless, 
the Senate Public Works Committee in 1971 determined that "the 
national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inade-
quate in every vital aspect."40 Previous congressional initiatives were 
intended to encourage pollution control while reflecting (pre-New 
Deal) deference to local authority.41 The comprehensive provisions of 
the 1972 Amendments represented a marked departure from this 
approach.42 For the first time, lawmakers embarked on a major fed-
eralization of the cleanup effort. 
When Congress approved the modern CWA, it originally mandated 
that all discharge of pollutants into the nation's navigable waters 
cease by 1985, that fish and other wildlife be protected, and that water 
quality be adequate for recreation by 1983.43 Further, Congress im-
posed a flat ban on the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.44 
By 1987, the various deadlines in the CWA had passed. Congress was 
35 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
36 See SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3674. 
37 See 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994). 
36 See Water Quality Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
39 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1994). 
40 S. Rep. No. 92-414, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3674. 
41 See id. at 3669. 
42 See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 453 
(1994). 
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
44 See id. 
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forced to extend the timetable for compliance with various technology 
standards to 1989.45 This deadline also has elapsed and achievement 
of the specified goals remains elusive. 
B. Effluent Limitations: BPT, BAT, and NSPS 
The CWA directs and empowers the EPA Administrator to estab-
lish water quality standards and promulgate regulations necessary to 
achieve the CWNs objectives.46 Perhaps the Administrator's most 
important duty is the promulgation of effluent guidelines limiting the 
discharge of pollutants.47 When considering these guidelines, the Ad-
ministrator must make three essential determinations: (1) whether 
the pollutant results from a non-point source or a point source; (2) 
whether the pollutant is classified as conventional, non-conventional, 
or toxic; and (3) whether the discharger is a new or existing source 
of pollution.48 
N on-point sources include pollution resulting from runoff attribut-
able to agriculture, silviculture, mining activities, and construction.49 
Here, the federal role is essentially one of advice and encourage-
ment.50 The EPA Administrator's authority over non-point sources is 
limited to the identification of areas in need of control and the evalu-
ation of state plans designed to control them.51 The CWA requires 
each state to develop and implement an area-wide waste treatment 
management plan for each area having substantial water quality con-
trol problems relating to non-point source pollution.52 
The primary thrust of the CWA is to limit and Ultimately to elimi-
nate point source discharges into U.S. waterways.53 Point sources may 
be classified as conventional, non-conventional, and toxic.64 Conven-
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)-(F) (1994). 
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1994). 
47 "Pollutants" include solid and other wastes, sewage, sludge, heat, rock, sand, and biological 
and radioactive materials. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994). 
48 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314. 
49 See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2) (1994). 
60 See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a). 
61 See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)-(b). 
62 See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b). 
63 "For simplicity, the universe of the causes of water pollution should be considered as 
covered fully by the categories of point and nonpoint sources .... Consignment to the point 
source category brings attentive regulation .... [R]elegation to the nonpoint source group 
brings loose oversight." WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.5 at 303 (2d ed. 
1994). A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" such as a "pipe, 
ditch, channel, or tunnel." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(d) (1994). 
64 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c)-(t) (1994). 
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tional pollutants are those classified as biological oxygen demanding, 
suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH.55 The most common sources 
for conventional pollutants are confined discharges from industrial 
plants and municipal wastewater treatment plants.56 Toxic pollutants 
are listed based on their toxicity, persistence, and degradability.57 The 
CWA classifies non-conventional pollutants as those that are neither 
conventional nor toxic.58 
U sing the latest scientific knowledge, the Administrator is to set 
effluent limitations for categories or classes of point sources. 59 When 
the CWA initially took effect in 1972, existing dischargers of conven-
tional pollutants were given a 1977 deadline to reduce pollutants 
through use of the "best practicable control technology currently 
available" (BPT).60 By 1984, dischargers were required to use the 
more stringent "best available technology economically achievable" 
(BAT).61 Toxic pollutants also are subject to the BAT standard,62 as 
are non-conventional pollutants.63 The CWA specifies factors the Ad-
ministrator must consider when assessing the applicable technology 
standard.64 In each instance, the cost of compliance is part of the 
calculus.65 Where EPA has not set specific guidelines for a particular 
pollutant or industry, the CWA empowers the Administrator to exer-
66 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1994). 
66 Karen M. Wardzinski et al., NPDES Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in 
CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 58, 62 (Parthenia Evans ed., 1994). 
57 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (1994). 
58 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F). 
59 Prior to the 1972 amendments, the primary measure of pollution control was the quality of 
the water receiving the effluent, rather than specific limits on the various pollutants. The water 
quality standards were set by the states based on their judgment of how the water could be 
used best. The Senate Public Works Committee found the water quality standards program 
"limited in its success." 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675 (1972). The 1972 Act relegates water quality 
standards to "a measure of program effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination 
and enforcement." Id. 
60 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
61 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). The 1987 amendments to the Act extended application of the 
various technology standards to no later than March 31, 1989. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F). As 
with many other objectives and goals of the Act, this deadline has passed without total success. 
62 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1994). 
63 See id. 
64 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
65 Th determine the best practicable control technology, the Administrator must do a cost-
benefit analysis and consider the age of equipment and facilities involved, and any other 
appropriate factors. See id. The Administrator also must consider "the cost of achieving such 
effluent reduction" when determining the BAT, and the cost of achieving effluent reductions 
when promulgating New Source Performance Standards. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(2)(B), 
1316(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
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cise discretion to set conditions "necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this chapter."66 
Standards for new point source dischargers are more exacting than 
those for existing sources.67 The CWA directs the Administrator to 
establish New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for a variety 
of operations that qualify as point source dischargers.68 They must 
meet effluent limitations through use of the "best available demon-
strated control technology."69 
The CWA also authorizes EPA to regulate the quality of the waste-
water flowing out of publicly owned treatment works (POTWs).70 The 
Administrator is empowered to define secondary treatment processes 
necessary to attain a minimum level of effluent quality for conven-
tional pollutants.71 
Most POTW s are designed primarily to treat domestic wastewater. 
Therefore, industrial users and others making discharges into POTW s 
must pre-treat their effluent. Rather than control these discharges 
directly, the CWA requires POTW s themselves to develop and en-
force pre-treatment programs based on standards developed by 
EPA.72 Then these programs are incorporated into the plant's permit 
under the NPDES.78 The central feature of the pre-treatment require-
ment is elimination of so-called "pass-through"74 or "interference."76 
As with other discharges, this effluent is subject to standards estab-
lished by the Administrator.76 Ultimately, wastewater discharged to 
a POTW from a new source must meet the same standards applicable 
to effluent discharged directly into a waterway.77 
66 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1994). 
67 See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(I)(A). 
68 See id. 
69 33 U .S.C. § 1316(a)(1). 
70 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
71 See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 133.102 (1994) (EPA standards). 
72 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b) (1994). 
73 See 40 C.F.R. § 403.8(c) (1996); see also NPDES discussion infra Part II. 
74 A "pass-through" is a discharge from a POTW that results in violation of the plant's NPDES 
permit. It can occur either alone or in combination with other discharges. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 403.3(n). 
75 "Interference" occurs when an indirect discharge disrupts the treatment processes of the 
POTW or otherwise results in a permit violation. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(i). 
76 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b). 
77 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(c). 
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C. Water Quality Standards 
In addition to technological requirements, point sources also are 
expected to comply with receiving water quality standards.78 The 
water quality based controls that dominated pre-1972 efforts at pol-
lution control remain a feature of the CWA.79 Each state is required 
to establish water quality standards for all bodies of water within its 
borders, subject to review by EPA.so Whereas technology-based and 
process-based controls are concerned with the reduction of pollution 
at the source, the water quality standards focus on the receiving 
waters and their designated uses.81 These standards create a base-
line for the level of a particular pollutant that a body of water may 
tolerate.82 If the discharger is able to demonstrate that the water 
quality will be protected adequately by reducing point source pollut-
ants through use of the appropriate technology-based standard alone, 
no additional controls are required.83 Otherwise, the discharger is 
subject to additional controls to safeguard receiving water quality.84 
D. The Federal-State Partnership: NPDES Permitting 
A central tenet of the 1972 Amendments was the absolute prohibi-
tion of pollutant discharge into the nation's waterways.86 For general 
industrial discharges into water, this prohibition only could be waived 
by the pollutant source receiving a permit specifying the manner and 
amount of pollution allowed.86 The NPDES permitting system is the 
central enforcement mechanism of the CWA.87 The permits are to 
incorporate all technology and receiving water quality standards with 
limits on the specific sources.88 In order to determine the effect of 
78 Receiving water is the water body into which point sources are discharged. 
79 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). 
80 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a). 
81 "Designated uses pretty well exhaust the possibilities from recreation to waste disposal." 
RODGERS, supra note 53, at 345. 
82 See 40 C.F.R. § 131 (1996) (containing EPA guidelines for establishing water quality stand-
ards). 
83 See 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b)(1) (1994) (authorizing "any more stringent limitation ... necessary 
to meet water quality standards"). 
84 See § 131l(b)(1). 
85 See 33 U.S.C. § 131l(a). 
86 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 131l(a), 1342(a) (1994). 
87 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
88 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1)-{2). 
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discharges and type of control technology required, applicants must 
test their effluent for various constituents, including toxics and other 
materials listed in the Code of Federal Regulations.89 The permits 
specify the control technology applicable to each pollutant, the ef-
fluent limitations a discharger must meet, and the deadline for com-
pliance.90 Each pollutant then must be monitored, and the results 
submitted to EPA or to another governing entity in periodic dis-
charge monitoring reports (DMRs).91 Permits under NPDES may be 
granted for no more than five years, but are renewable thereafter.92 
A discharger may continue to operate under a prior permit when it 
submits a timely application for renewal.93 
EPA has statutory authority to administer the NPDES program.94 
However, the CWA recognizes "the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."95 Thus, 
Congress has provided that states wishing to oversee their own water 
pollution control efforts may do so under NPDES, subject to EPA 
approval and oversight.96 The states must demonstrate both the abil-
ity and the legal authority to carry out such a permit program.97 If 
the EPA Administrator determines that the necessary requirements 
have been met, the federal permit program is suspended.98 However, 
authorization for state permitting may be withdrawn if the state fails 
to comply with the provisions of the CWA and corrective action is not 
taken after notice and a public hearing.99 Each state also is required 
to submit an annual report to EPA describing the quality of the water 
within its borders and the progress made toward meeting the CWA 
obj ectives.1°O 
89 See 40 C.F.R. § 122 app. D (1996). 
90 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2133 
(f)-(g). 
91 See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(i)-{j). 
92 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.46(a)-(b). 
93 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.6(a)(I). 
94 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(d), 1342(a) (1994). 
96 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). 
96 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
97 See id. 
98 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1). 
99 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3). 
100 See 33 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1) (1994). 
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E. Clean Water Act Enforcement: Non-compliance Orders, Civil 
and Criminal Sanctions 
Enforcement of the NPDES program lies largely with the EPA 
Administrator or similar state agent.10l If a discharger fails to comply 
with the requirements of a permit issued by EPA or an appropriate 
state agency, the Administrator is authorized to issue a compliance 
order or bring a civil action in federal court for appropriate relief.loo 
Violators are subject to civil penalties of up to twenty-five thousand 
dollars per day.loo The CWA further provides for criminal penalties of 
up to fifty thousand dollars per day for knowing violationslO4 and up 
to twenty-five thousand dollars per day for negligent violations.106 
The CWA also provides for citizen suits against polluters, or against 
the EPA Administrator or equivalent state administrator for alleged 
dereliction of non-discretionary duties.106 In appropriate circum-
stances, state governors may commence civil actions against the Ad-
ministrator for alleged failure to enforce effluent standards which are 
detrimental to the health or welfare of their citizens or to the water 
quality within their own states.107 
F. Why the Clean Water Program Was Federalized: Strengthening 
Enforcement 
The impetus for the massive changes in the CWA was similar to 
the reasons for the federalization of environmental programs in other 
areas-the overriding perception that water quality was not improv-
ing, and that the states could not be depended on to improve the 
situation. lOB The possibility that some states would not implement 
clean water goals also supports the argument in favor of federal 
regulation of the environment: Uniform federal standards would pre-
vent the creation of economic incentives for states to further relax 
101 See 33 u.s.c. § 1342 (1994). 
100 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(l) (1994). 
103 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). 
104 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2). 
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(l). 
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). 
107 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h). 
106 See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 
387 (2d ed. 1990). 
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their standards in the typical "race to the bottom."109 Moreover, even 
if some states did improve their water quality, despite other states' 
economic incentives to lower standards, the states that did not im-
prove their water quality would harm other states' efforts due to 
cross-boundary pollution.lIO State control of water pollution became 
subject to federal law in 1972 when Congress first created the ambient 
standards.111 However, overall enforcement by the states against pol-
luters and the record of enforcement against the states by the federal 
government were poor.1I2 The problem stemmed from a lack of enthu-
siasm to enforce state and industry compliance and from a lack of 
enforceable standards.1I3 According to one commentator: "In practice, 
the [pre-1972] enforcement procedures were subject to excessive ne-
gotiations and delay. Municipal and industrial polluters and state and 
federal agencies spent considerable amounts of time bargaining with 
no apparent cleanup results. There were few enforceable agreements 
and timetables were not met."114 This was not an uncommon problem 
with the initial attempts to develop strong environmentallaws.u5 As 
bluntly stated by Professors Menell and Stewart: "No program of 
environmental regulation is better than its enforcement system. The 
best standards in the world would accomplish nothing unless they 
were complied with, and purely voluntary compliance cannot be ex-
pected within our social and economic institutions."116 
Therefore, when debating changes to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act in 1972, both the United States House of Representatives 
and Senate believed that a key to changing water quality through the 
law was stronger enforcement.1I7 Thus, Congress considered vigorous 
federal enforcement of the new stricter technology standards to be 
critical to the success of the CWA.1I8 
109 Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Mod-
els, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1172 (1995). 
110 See HARVEY LIEBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS: THE 1972 WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT 197 (1975). 
111 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (1994). 
112 See Andreen, supra note 20, at 226-27. 
113 See id. at 226-29; ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 
6-7 (1993). 
114 LIEBER, supra note 110, at 20. 
116 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 354-55. 
116 MENELL & STEWART, supra note 42, at 531. 
117 See Andreen, supra note 20, at 223. 
118 See id. at 226-29. 
1997] ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 15 
Nevertheless, political realities, as well as the hope for some local 
tailoring, demanded that the states maintain some role in the new 
scheme.n9 As stated in the CWA, the states were given the power 
under certain circumstances to administer the NPDES program "'to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."'12o 
Unique circumstances of a state, such as a particularly pernicious 
pollutant, might require specifically tailored enforcement action best 
handled at the state level.121 However, overall control provisions in the 
statute indicate that Congress expected strict adherence to the goal 
of clean water and to a limitation on bargaining with polluters.l22 
Unfortunately, this meant that one of the hoped for goals for some 
Congress members-to eliminate the state-level administration of the 
Act completely-was not going to occur, and that there would be a 
reintroduction of the uncertainty of state zeal and ability to enforce 
the new laws.l23 
In theory, the 1972 amendments to the CWA still achieved the goal 
of strict enforcement in the face of continued state involvement by 
having strict federal control over state administration.l24 The fact that 
states had to meet certain requirements in order to administer the 
NPDES program, the fact that individual compliance data was to be 
monitored by EPA, and the fact that EPA could revoke the authority 
of a state to run a program if the state were not running the program 
effectively and in compliance with the statute, were supposed to 
insure that the use of state enforcement would not weaken the clean 
water program.l26 Citizen suit provisions also were to spur both fed-
eral and state enforcement.126 
G. The Problems with the State-Federal Partnership 
Despite the elaborate scheme for enforcement of strong standards, 
enforcement has been highly criticized and government studies show 
119 See RODGERS, supra note 53, at 363. 
120 Environmental Protection Agency v. California State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 
U.S. 200, 206--08 (1975) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV». 
121 See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Water Pollution: Differences Among the States in Issuing 
Permits Limiting the Discharge of Pollutants, 6-7 (Jan. 1996). 
122 See RODGERS, supra note 53, at 364--65. 
123 See id. at 3~. 
124 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1994). 
125 See § 1342(c)-(d)j California State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 206~. 
126 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). 
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that enforcement continues to be poor.127 Whether the responsibility 
lies primarily with the federal or state side of the partnership, there 
are many structural reasons to suspect that strict, uniform state 
enforcement is not occurring. A review of the factors that could 
contribute to this enforcement decline are set out below. 
1. The Threat of Program Revocation Is Ineffective 
Although there is some evidence that initially EPA zealously used 
its power of program revocation to hold the states to a high stand-
ard,128 the possibility of program revocation is now almost non-exis-
tent. l29 There are several reasons why the threat of program revoca-
tion is no longer credible. First, in an era of the need for state 
cooperation, it is seen as a blunt and too harsh instrument for simply 
altering state behavior as to enforcement; negotiation seems the pre-
ferred route.130 Second, the statutory and regulatory requirements for 
withdrawing the program are very complex. As stated by Professor 
Rodgers: "[T]he procedures for withdrawal of state programs would 
be suitable for the Nuremberg trials, and will be invoked only upon 
epochal occasions."13l But probably the most important reason for the 
curtailment of the federal ability to take back state administration of 
an NPDES program is the reality of limited federal resources to 
administer all the programs. l32 
Enforcement and compliance work represented approximately 
twenty-five percent of EPA's budget in 1990.133 With recent budget 
cuts and disputes over funding, it is clear that EPA's direct enforce-
ment and secondary enforcement of state programs is damaged.134 
2. Data to Monitor the States' Programs Is Incomplete 
Even if EPA were to retain credible power to take back enforce-
ment of a state's NPDES program, the structure of EPA's monitoring 
of the states' programs may not give an accurate picture of the effec-
127 See Kuehn, supra note 30, at 2388. 
128 See LIEBER, supra note 110, at 121. 
129 See RODGERS, supra note 53, at 367. 
130 See Percival, supra note 109, at 1175. 
131 RODGERS, supra note 53, at 368. 
132 See generaUy Order, supra note 22 (finding EPNs oversight of Georgia's compliance ''totally 
inadequate"). 
133 JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 2 (1995). 
134 See id. at 115. 
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tiveness of the NPDES program in controlling water pollution or 
meeting the general goal of clean water. EPA primarily receives raw 
data concerning the self-reported effluent levels of all major NPDES 
permitted parties.135 These are then compared to the terms of the 
permits.136 This method of oversight may distort the true picture of 
the health of a state's water quality regulation in several ways.137 
First, EPA's received NPDES information only allows a comparison 
of a permitted party's individual pollutant monitoring results with the 
terms of that party's NPDES permit.13B It requires no formalized 
analysis of the terms of the permits themselves. Although there are 
standards governing the requirements of an NPDES permit and EPA 
retains the right to disapprove permit terms, there appears to be 
great flexibility in how a state sets terms in the granting of a permit.139 
States are not required to have formal administrative hearings on the 
granting or termination of an NPDES permit, and only recently have 
been required to provide judicial review of final permit decisions.14o 
In a new report prepared for Senator Baucus on this issue of 
divergent standards in the permits, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) noted that there is no real consistency in how pollutant levels 
are set in NPDES permits.14l Although the report noted that these 
differences can be due to many legitimate factors meant to preserve 
state flexibility, such as the receiving water quality and proposed uses 
135 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a) (1996). 
136 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(h), 122.41(1)(4), (7) (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a). 
137 There is also the possible problem of dishonesty in self-reporting from the sources them-
selves. Decreased funding has raised concern over EPA's and the state's ability to monitor 
self-reporting through spot checks. This is a legitimate problem with respect to the overall 
effectiveness of enforcement. However, this Article is concerned with systematic problems in 
enforcement arising from EPA supervision of state NPDES programs. Systematic structural 
problems exist whether or not the individual permitted sources are reporting their effluent data 
accurately. 
138 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(h)(I), (4), (7). 
139 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316(a), 1342(a)(1), (d)(1)-(2) (1994). A state may permit the discharge of 
any pollutant "upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable require-
ments under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this title, or (B) prior to the taking 
of necessary implementing actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the 
[state] determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(a)(I) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.41-.44 (describing permit conditions 
applicable to state programs). 
140 See Gilbert M. Zemansky & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Adjudicatory Hearings as Part of the 
NPDES Permit Process, 9 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 1,3 (1980); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972 (1996) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 123) (requiring judicial review of permit terms as of June 7, 1996). 
141 See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Water Pollution: Differences Among the States in Issuing 
Permits Limiting the Discharge of Pollutants, 6-7 (Jan. 1996). 
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of the receiving waters, other factors may include how each state 
assesses cancer risks or makes assumptions about the overall cleanli-
ness of a water body.l42 And in at least one instance, a state specifically 
did not apply new standards because the state, in its own view, 
thought that the standards were too strict.l43 In that case, the report 
noted that EPA did not withdraw the program because it was "an un-
realistic option."l44 Whether this is a major problem or not is unclear 
because EPA has no consistent oversight or review of the NPDES 
limits within new or revised permits.l45 
Furthermore, without specific requirements, discretion can come 
under enormous pressure to accommodate the permitees. A 1980 
study revealed that dischargers initiated nearly all challenges to an 
NPDES permit, and over half received relief from requirements.146 
Thus, it is clearly possible that the ability of the state to set the terms 
of the initial NPDES permits may cause wide inconsistency in pollu-
tion control. 
Moreover, when a polluter is out of compliance, EPA is supposed to 
receive information which tells what state action was taken.147 How-
ever, there is no standard by which to judge this action. Although 
EPA may receive a report saying that the state agency has entered 
into an administrative agreement to correct the violation, the agree-
ment might be pursued vigorously in a short amount of time in one 
state, while the violator might dally freely in another state with a new 
permit reflecting newly relaxed standards.148 The empty threat of 
EPA taking back the program merely underscores the fact that a hard 
look at these differences in enforcement actions between the states 
will not occur. In one recently publicized case, Georgia's Environ-
mental Protection Division (EPD) suspended enforcement of water 
pollution standards for more than two dozen sewage treatment plants 
on the same day they were imposed, all without public review or 
input. 149 
In addition to the problems of analysis of the initial consistency of 
permit requirements of each state as noted above, EPNs system of 
142 See id. at 11-13. 
143 See id. at 6. 
144 Id. 
146 See id. at 11, 13-14. 
146 See Zemansky & Zerbe, supra note 140, at 4. 
147 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(1) (1996). 
148 See Percival, supra note 109, at 1175. 
149 See Charles Seabrook, Water Pollution Standards Waived, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 13, 
1995, at C8. In December 1996, Judge Alice Bonner of the Fulton County Superior Court ruled 
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oversight (and indeed the oversight system of most of the states) 
only analyzes the performance of major sources.1oo Additionally, the 
CWA does not even require certain point sources to obtain individual 
NPDES permits.1S1 It may be impossible to track all sources, some of 
which might go unnoticed and avoid permitting altogether. But there 
is no way to know this. By the very act of not requiring information 
about certain polluters, EPA has given many states license not to 
have an effective permit history of smaller sources. Thus, such infor-
mation would be largely unavailable even if EPA wanted it. 
Such a lack of information could be excused if small point sources 
were tiny contributors to water pollution. Assuming, however, that 
non-major sources are not de minimis contributors to overall water 
pollution, the failure to examine them when trying to get a complete 
picture of pollution sources can be justified only by an assumption that 
data from compliance of major NPDES permitted sources is sufficient 
to give a true and accurate picture of overall compliance of all sources. 
Among permitted sources, there has been some indication that the 
frequency of violation is related to the size of the source with per 
capita violations increasing as sources get smaller.l62 Unless the major 
sources are truly representative of all violators, the inability to track 
pollution systematically from all sources prohibits an effective analy-
sis of state NPDES permit programs, and thus the NPDES program 
generally.l63 If the major source data received by EPA is unable to 
reflect the entire picture, it undercuts even further any pretense EPA 
has of adequately enforcing the NPDES program and achieving its 
goal of clean water through the current federal-state system. 
3. Citizen Suit Litigation Gives Too Much Credence to State 
"Enforcement" 
Even though the possibility of citizen suits may pressure state 
action, case law has weakened this enforcement provision.1M In 1987, 
that waivers of such pennit tenns must be made public. See Charles Seabrook, Judge: EPD 
Waivers Must Be in Public, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 4, 1996, at Cl. 
160 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a). 
151 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(g)(7)-(8), 122.28 (1996). 
152 See Margaret H. Hornbaker, A Watershed in Pollution Control? The Watershed Approach 
and its Implications for Small POTWs 7 (1995) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, University of Wash-
ington) (on file with the author). 
153 See PEOPLE FOR PUGET SOUND, AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY'S 
WATER QUALITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (1993) 
(on file with the author). 
154 See Steven Russo, State8, Citizens, and the Clean Water Act: State Admini8trative En-
forcement and the Diligent Prosecution Defense, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 211,231 (1995). 
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Congress shielded state enforcement of NPDES violations from citi-
zens' suits if the alleged permit breaches were being "diligently prose-
cuted.1I1OO Most courts have interpreted this "diligent prosecution" bar 
broadly to preclude any citizen's suit based upon the same CW A 
violations alleged in an administrative action, not allowing such chal-
lenges "merely because [the citizens] do not agree with the type 
or extent of punishment imposed."166 This problem is exacerbated 
when many consent orders are not made public or could appear to be 
"sweetheart" deals.167 Thus, judicial relief in a citizen's suit challenge 
to an NPDES permit enforcement is an "odd duck" indeed, and gen-
erally occurs only when the state specifically does not impose any 
penalty for the NPDES permit violation.168 This allows the states to 
lower standards strategically by taking minimal actions to prevent 
citizens' suits.169 
4. Effective Enforcement of the Clean Water Act Program Is Left 
Entirely to the States 
As of 1993, thirty-seven states had approved NPDES permit pro-
grams-a number too large for EPA to monitor and police effec-
tively.l60 Thus, the states that failed to improve the cleanliness of the 
nation's waters in the past are now the critical link in enforcing the 
1972 Amendments. Although there are more articulable standards for 
individual water polluters through the NPDES program than there 
were before 1972, it is obvious that adequate enforcement is a critical 
part of the CWA.161 
The simplistic belief that having clean water standards on the books 
will ensure uniformly clean water nationwide is not true. Ade-
quate enforcement is needed to reach this goal. Since enforcement 
will occur effectively only through state action, the original goals of 
the strengthened CWA-to have uniform regulations and clean water 
166 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1994). 
166 Russo, supra note 154, at 231; but see Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 
1111, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that shield of administrative enforcement does not protect 
polluter from suits compelling compliance when NPDES permit itself has not been altered to 
reflect temporary lessening of standards). 
167 See Environmental Community Action, Inc., A Secret Affair ... When Companies Violate 
Environmental Law (Sept. 13, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
168 See Knee Deep Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co., 94 F.3d 514, 515-17 (9th Cir. 1996). 
169 See Rodas, supra note 26, at 1622. 
160 See RODGERS, supra note 53, at 363 n.15. 
161 See Geiger, supra note 9. 
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throughout the country-now depend on whether adequate enforce-
ment is occurring at the state leve1.162 
As noted in the Introduction, there is a notion that because states 
have programs and bureaucracies in place to enforce environmental 
laws, state recalcitrance in enforcement is a problem of the past.163 
Indeed, the 1994 Republican congressional majority indicated a will-
ingness to reduce federal environmental regulation, ostensibly based 
on the fact that the states now have both a will and a way to protect 
the health and well-being of their citizens and their environment.164 
But simply giving the fox some rules on guarding hen houses does not 
make the hen house any safer. Many people who work in the field 
claim that there has been state resistance to environmental laws, 
including to the CWA.165 Cases show problems of compliance in areas 
that are visible such as promulgation of water quality standards.1OO 
Early anecdotal observations suggested great resistance to meeting 
federal goalS.167 However, whether this is only an occasional problem 
or a measurably systemic one never has been empirically tested. 
III. WHAT CAN WE LEARN ABOUT STATE ENFORCEMENT? 
This Article examines empirically some indicia of state enforcement 
of the CWA, primarily by statistical comparisons of enforcement ac-
162 Of course, one might argue that whether one of the goals of the 1972 amendments was 
uniform state enforcement is unimportant to whether the administration of the Act should 
reflect that goal today. "Dynamic Statutory Interpretation," which is one method of legislative 
intent, "track[s] current political trends in order to achieve an interpretation of a statute that 
best fits the values and goals animating current legislators, administrative agencies, and other 
interested actors." John C. Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter (reviewing 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994», 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2209, 2212 (1995). 
However, even acknowledging this as the valid method of statutory interpretation does not 
let one ignore uniform state standards and enforcement in the Clean Water Act. For although 
such enforcement may not be apparent from an administrative standpoint, there appears to be 
no lessening at all of the desires and expectations of Congress and citizens that such a result is 
expected from the Clean Water Act. See ADLER, supra note 113, at 228 (recognizing that widely 
varying standards are still a problem motivating a federal response). 
163 See Geiger, supra note 9, at 113. 
164 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Adversaries Support Pollution Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, 
at A2; Kuehn, supra note 30, at 2374. 
165 David Pope, Remarks at the Atlanta Bar Association, Environmental and Thxic Thrt 
Section Presentation, Past, Present, and Future of Toxic 1brt Litigation, (Dec. 7, 1995) (from 
contemporaneous notes of the author). 
166 See Order, supra note 22. 
167 See Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of EPA's 
Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, 1970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683, 694 (1988). 
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tions between two representative states. This will allow an analysis 
of comparative stringency of enforcement and the ability of these 
states, in the absence of adequate federal oversight, to achieve the 
goal of uniform, stringent, national standards for pollution. 
A. Discovering Indicia of Compliance Consistency 
As noted above, actual data concerning enforcement of the NPDES 
program by the states may be incomplete.l68 Statutes and regulations 
governing state administration of the NPDES program require only 
periodic reports of effluent concentrations from already permitted 
major sources in each state, and a summary of actions taken against 
noncompliant sources.169 EPA, or the state agency administering the 
program, compiles this information into Quarterly Non-compliance 
Reports (QNCRs), which summarize all sources in violation of their 
permits within an NPDES program jurisdiction and what broad ac-
tions the administrator of that NPDES program took in response to 
these violations.17o These QNCRs merely show that violations are 
occurring and that these administrators supposedly are addressing 
them.l7l Violations may be due to an exceedance of actual pollutant 
levels in an NPDES program, to reporting, or to other administrative 
violations.172 However, just because these reports show that, almost 
without exception, actions are taken when a violation appears, does 
not mean that enforcement is effective, or that ultimately the pur-
poses of the CWA are being served. 
According to the Supreme Court in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay 
Foundation,l73 there is an assumption that any administrative en-
forcement action of the state or federal government against an 
NPDES permit violator is taken with the purpose of securing compli-
ance with the CWA.174 However, no one has tested this proposition. 
An "action taken" may vary enormously from strict fines and/or shut-
down of the offending source, to negligible fines and an agreement 
which only requires remote compliance with the terms of the initial 
permit.175 Although examining where a state's enforcement actions fall 
on this spectrum may give some picture regarding how extensive 
168 See supra Part II(G)(2). 
169 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45 (1996). 
170 See id. 
171 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(1)(iii). 
172 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(2)(iiHiii). 
173 484 U.S. 49 (1989). 
174 See id. at 59-60. 
175 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1319(cHd), (g) (1994). 
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enforcement is in one state, it does not tell if the state is enforcing the 
NPDES laws in the best way to ensure the ultimate protection ofthe 
state's waters or compliance with the CWA. In isolation, enforcement 
patterns reveal little about the effectiveness of overall enforcement, 
since it is possible that "mild" enforcement actions may be bad for the 
environment or, conversely, may be most appropriate to meet the ul-
timate goal of clean water in certain cases.176 However, a compari-
son of enforcement patterns between states does shed some light on 
whether NPDES permit limits actually are being enforced in the best 
way to ensure compliance with the CWA. 
Uniform severity of enforcement actions generally should be ex-
pected when comparing the administration of NPDES programs in 
different states, particularly when controlling for differences due to 
types of sources. Indeed, two of the goals of the 1972 amendments to 
the CWA were to ensure uniformity of minimum standards governing 
clean water and to force strict compliance with these clean water 
standards subject to the individual source pollution circumstances of 
the states. Failure to find such similarity between two states (unex-
plainable by random variation) would indicate that enforcement ac-
tions are inconsistent in the NPDES program and that the quality of 
cleanup efforts varies from state to state. This disparity supports the 
idea that effective enforcement may not be occurring in some of the 
state-administered NPDES programs. 
Although complete data regarding all source violations and re-
sponding actions in each of the NPDES programs does not exist, the 
QNCR data compiled by EPA does allow a comparison of certain 
indicia of the consistency and strength of enforcement action taken 
against major source violators in various states.177 Thus, this study 
uses contemporaneous QNCR data of one and one-half years178 re-
176 This may be especially true in situations of municipal sewage treatment systems where 
public health constraints may prevent a "shutdown" of the offending source. 
177 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(2) (1996). 
178 The period covered for the State of Georgia is January of 1994 to June of 1995, while the 
period covered for Washington is April of 1994 to June of 1995. Although the data from 
Washington was supposed to run contemporaneously with the Georgia data from January of 
1994 to June of 1995, EPA's Region X was unable to supply the first quarter data. Since there 
are no significant winter spikes in non-compliance and since Georgia sources are fewer in 
number, all of the Georgia data was used for more accurate analysis. Because we are examining 
average times of consecutive non-compliance for any source in any given month, and are not 
doing a total measurement, the number of data "instances" from each state should not bias the 
result. 
Although 15 or 18 months may capture an unusual time statistically, there is no reason to 
assume that is the case. When faced with analysis constraints, limits on the amount of data had 
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garding major source violators in two states, Georgia and Washing-
ton, to examine this strength of enforcement.179 
The most important measurable indication of enforcement consis-
tency and strength is the average length of time that violators are out 
of compliance with their NPDES permit criteria before they come 
back into compliance or before they are shut down. The QNCRs show 
whether permit criteria were exceeded for a particular pollutant at 
any time in the monthly reporting periods.180 Moreover, even sources 
subject to enforcement action must file reports showing monthly per-
mit violations if they have not corrected permit limit violations.181 
Other things being equal, the same permit violations over periods of 
consecutive months show that whatever "enforcement action" was 
taken by the state to correct the initial violation has not been effective 
in meeting that goal. Therefore, the average length of time out of com-
pliance for similar sources in consecutive months can serve as an 
accurate surrogate for measuring the effectiveness of enforcement. 
More stringent penalties for violations or stringent demands in com-
pliance schedules presumably would produce an incentive for more 
immediate compliance. l82 Of course, "non-compliance" statistics in 
QNCRs will not reflect changes of permit terms in compliance agree-
ments. This problem is noted earlier as a general problem in NPDES 
effectiveness and accountability. However, given this and other limi-
tations, such as the absence of minor source data, the average length 
of time similarly situated NPDES permittees continue to be out of 
compliance remains the best way of measuring and comparing state 
enforcement zeal and ability. 
In order to make an accurate comparison between Washington's 
and Georgia's compliance, the study uses multivariate regression 
analysis which accounts for differences in enforcement patterns due 
to other distinctions between the states which may cause differing 
to be imposed. As for questions of which 18 or 15 months to use, these last available reports 
should most reflect the current situation with respect to these two states. 
The reporting of violations in the QN CR data from both states is methodologically consistent 
for purposes of this comparison. 
179 A description of the data and how it was received can be found in Appendix A. 
180 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(2)(i)(A). 
181 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45(a)(2)(i)(B). 
182 See ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNITY ACTION, INC. (ECO-AcTION) WITH THE GRASSROOTS 
ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CITIZENS 1 (1996). "The nego-
tiated fines paid by the companies [in Georgia] were well below the maximum penalties allowed 
by law. Hence, settlement penalties are woefully inadequate to serve as incentives to companies 
to comply with the law." [d. 
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enforcement.l83 Although Georgia and Washington are of roughly 
similar size with similar urban/suburban/rural population distribution, 
the possible effects due to qualitative differences in sources must be 
considered in order to measure the effects of enforcement due to 
different state policies. The only obvious differences not attributable 
to different state approaches to enforcement are related to the type 
of sources involved. For instance, it may be true that compliance with 
ammonia limitations is always more difficult than compliance with 
limitations on other kinds of pollutants. Thus, this study controls for 
the effects of type of pollution by regressing out the statistical effects 
on differing state enforcement corresponding to the type of pollutant. 
Cursory analysis of NPDES quarterly non-compliance reports in-
dicates that municipal sources are far more likely to be out of compli-
ance with NPDES permits for longer periods of time than are indus-
trial sources.l84 To the extent that this is true, it may be because 
municipalities have limits on resources to help with compliance, and 
because a shutdown of these sources usually is not feasible since that 
would cause more pollution or human health problems.l85 Therefore, 
a dummy variable was created identifying each source as a municipal 
or a non-municipal source. Effects due to differences based on the 
relative proportion of municipal systems are screened out so that 
effects in enforcement rates are not attributable to differences in 
proportions of municipal sources. Finally, to recognize the cumulative 
effects and the severity of multiple source violators, this study treats 
violations for multiple pollutants as separate violations with separate 
non-compliance times. 
There could be other differences between the states which impact 
non-compliance times. If the effects due to different types of pollution 
sources and the special problems associated with municipal enforce-
ment are controlled, however, any remaining statistical differences 
183 Multivariate Regression or Multiple Regression Analysis is an "interval level statistical 
technique that uses several independent variables to predict or explain one dependent variable 
based on minimizing squared error." KENNETH J. MEIER & JEFFREY L. BRUDNEY, APPLIED 
STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 446 (3d ed. 1993). This method holds confounding 
factors (variables) as constant as possible when measuring the relational effects between vari-
ables. See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 16 (4th ed. 1990). 
184 See EPA Wash. Q. Non-Compliance Rep., July 1, 1993-Sept.30, 1993; EPA Ga. Q. Non-
Compliance Rep., Jan. 1, 1994-Mar. 311994. 
185 ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 108, at 481. 
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can be attributed to enforcement differences not contemplated by the 
CWA.186 
B. Results of the Comparison 
Over the reporting period, Georgia had 133 non-compliant 
sources and Washington had 1,243 non-compliant sources.187 Although 
the states are of similar geographic and population size and distribu-
tion, one would expect Washington to have more licensed sources for 
direct pollutant discharge into water due to its much larger coast-
line.l88 
A statistical analysis of the average lengths of time in which 
NPDES permitted major sources were not in compliance with their 
permits showed that Georgia's non-compliant sources were out of 
compliance an average of 5.5 months.189 Washington's non-compliant 
sources were out of compliance an average of 3.6 months.1OO These 
differences in non-compliance times between sources in the State of 
Georgia and sources within the State of Washington are not the result 
of random variations which one would expect if length of NPDES 
violations in each state were drawn simply from a larger set of na-
tional average non-compliance times which are normally distributed 
around a single mean. The probability that the differences are the 
result of random variations is exceedingly small, at one in one bil-
lion.191 
Non-compliance times were significantly higher in Georgia for both 
municipal and non-municipal sources separately and for all sources 
186 Even though this analysis controlled for these distinctions, ultimately it is important to 
note that even if one state did have a disproportionate number of municipal sources or permitted 
sources with a particularly troublesome pollutant to control, the distinction would be immaterial 
to the overall goal of the Clean Water Act to protect human health and the nation's waters. 
High amounts of overall pollution load can cause associated health and environmental effects, 
regardless of the reasons for their existence. 
187 See Appendix A-2. 
188 According to the 1958 edition of the WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, the Washington State 
coastline is 2,724 miles (including islands), while the Georgia coastline is 96 miles. THE WORLD 
BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, 8606 (1958). The 1971 edition of the World Book simplifies the results 
(presumably by only counting exterior ocean shoreline and not island and internal coastline) by 
noting that Washington has 157 miles of coastline while Georgia has 100 miles. THE WORLD 
BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, Vol. W, 47, Vol. G, 115 (1971). 
189 See Appendix A-2. 
190 See id. 
191 See Appendix A-3. 
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together. l92 Even when accounting for effects due to whether a source 
is municipal or non-municipal and for effects due to the type of viola-
tions, the probability that random variation accounts for the differ-
ence in the average length of non-compliance time for non-compliant 
sources is still approximately one in one billion.1OO When one discards 
violations due to reporting and only counts average time of non-com-
pliance for actual pollutant sources, a comparison between much 
smaller subsets, the average period of non-compliance time is still 
significantly higher for pollutant sources in the State of Georgia. l94 
Thus, differences in non-compliance periods between NPDES facili-
ties in the State of Georgia and the State of Washington are related 
statistically to the state in which the source is located, irrespective of 
the type of pollution source in each state. Since the statistical differ-
ences exist in the absence of effects related to the sources themselves, 
one may infer other factors at work-differences in enforcement pat-
terns, attitudes, or zeal exist between the two sample states.195 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS 
A. State Enforcement of the Clean Water Act Is Not Uniform 
The most direct implication of the study is apparent. For reasons 
unconnected to the need to tailor enforcement to partiCUlar circum-
stances of a state, state enforcement is not uniform. Since enforce-
ment compliance is intended to correct excess pollution not allowed 
by the statutory scheme, this indicates that overall environmental 
quality is inconsistent among the states, and substandard for at least 
one state.1OO The study also indicates that the differing enforcement 
patterns are probably linked directly to differences in state resolve 
192 See Appendix A-4. 
193 See Appendix A-5. 
194 See Appendix A-7. 
196 I do not attempt to claim that this disparate enforcement is related necessarily to any 
inherent "wrong" on the part ofthe enforcement authority of Georgia or any other state. There 
can be various benign reasons why some states take longer to enforce against known pollution 
sources, including cultural differences regarding the value of negotiation. It has been hard for 
any state to measure the effectiveness of such patterns in any empirical way to determine even 
what is "good" or "bad." This is one very important reason why such a study is needed. The 
data in this study show that the differences in enforcement are not related to source differences, 
which the Clean Water Act anticipates, but instead result from something that lies outside the 
ambit of the Act. 
196 See discussion, infra, Part III B. 
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and zeal to enforce the law. It also may be hypothesized that the states 
could be lax in other areas where EPA supervision and authority is 
weak, such as the licensing of major sources and the determination 
of the permit limits themselves. 
This lack of uniform enforcement certainly challenges the assump-
tion that state participation in the CWA is adequate or effective. 
Whether this is "bad" in the pejorative sense, is another question 
entirely, which cannot be answered within the scope of this Article. 
Certainly the citizens with the weaker enforcement may suffer more 
environmental damage. But it is of course possible that we as a society 
are willing to pay this price in order to facilitate some agreement on 
program goals, even if the goals are not always met. Nevertheless, on 
its face the CWA does not countenance this as a credible reason for 
disparity. If it is to be the reason for the disparate results apparent 
in this survey, it should be considered· directly, rather than imposed 
indirectly through administrative action, where the policy decision 
essentially is insulated from public participation and review. 
Although the statistics only show non-uniformity and do not indi-
cate whether states necessarily are getting better or worse, the study 
provides the empirical evidence needed to support the anecdotal as-
sertions that state enforcement is weakening and that a new race to 
the bottom is occurring. 
B. Provisions to Help Ensure State Compliance Are Currently 
Ineffective 
As anticipated, even though there are problems with state enforce-
ment, the federal oversight system in the CW A is not dealing effec-
tively with this issue.l97 Without the legitimate threat of an EPA 
takeover, state program management and enforcement can remain 
weak, and hundreds of millions of American citizens may not be 
receiving effective, legally mandated clean water. 
Since much of this may be traced to EPA's inability to afford ade-
quate oversight or direct regulation in place of the states, this would 
indicate that funding cuts to EPA indeed have diminished environ-
mental quality. Quality is affected not just by EPA's ability to take 
direct enforcement or to direct and create new policy initiatives, but 
also by EPA's loss of credibility as a stringent overseer of state 
enforcement and compliance. Until EPA displays a willingness to step 
197 Similarly, citizen suits have not ensured environmental compliance. Data, however, suggest 
that not all Clean Water Act suits have been prosecuted diligently. 
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in and fund enforcement in any state that is incapable of doing the 
enforcement itself, the states will have no hammer to require strict, 
legal enforcement. If the threat of a takeover is credible, it does not 
mean that federalism will disappear or that EPA will take over all 
CWA enforcement. If real, the threat of losing local control should be 
enough of an incentive to prod most states into effective enforcement 
programs. 
Necessarily, these results also indicate that further budget reduc-
tions and a turnover of greater administrative power to the states 
would be inconsistent with the goals of the current CWA. Reduction 
in EPA's budget and oversight functions only can be taken for what 
it is, a weakening of the strength of United States environmental 
laws. 
As stated by Joel Mintz: 
[O]ne can hope that the Congress will take account of the true 
dimensions of the agency's expanded workload, the urgency of its 
budgetary needs, and the larger cost to society iffederal environ-
mental legislation is not implemented effectively. If the Congress 
fails to do this, it seems certain that many of our environmental 
laws, so proudly heralded at the time of their enactment, will be 
administered haltingly-and only partially enforced. l98 
In another ominous sign, one potentially strong method of state 
enforcement oversight, citizen suit enforcement, also has been weak-
ened over time by congressional action and judicial interpretation. 
Much of the "policing" of state enforcement of federal environmental 
laws was to occur through citizen pressure on state and federal agen-
cies.l99 Congress has "authorized citizen enforcement for nearly every 
major piece of federal environmental legislation."2°O Although some 
commentators have argued that this gives citizens enormous power 
to require immediate enforcement, successful citizen prosecution at 
most prompts authorities to take minimal enforcement action.201 As 
noted earlier, the citizen suit provisions in the CWA, as well as in 
other environmental laws, bar the prosecution of an action if a state 
is "diligently prosecuting" a violation.202 
198 MINTZ, supra note 133, at 118. 
199 Russo, supra note 154, at 211. 
200 Charles S. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests: How the Citizen Suit Provision of the 
Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1957, 1959 (1995). 
201 See id. at 1960 n.12. 
200 See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (1994) (describing "diligent prosecution" bar in the Clean 
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The study in this Article suggests that many of the "diligent prose-
cution" findings, at least for the CWA, may be factually incorrect. If 
the lack of enforcement can be linked not to individual circumstances 
of each state's pollution sources but instead simply to a lack of zeal in 
enforcing strict laws, the law would require that citizens' suits chal-
lenging the lack of enforcement be given more attention.203 But in 
other environmental arenas with even fewer indicia of state enforce-
ment, when a state has indicated that a source is out of compliance, 
and a corrective action is taken or a fine imposed, it is difficult to prove 
that there has not been "diligent prosecution," even where enforce-
ment actions in fact may be routinely less stringent than they might 
be in another state or location.204 Thus, citizen suit pressure is not an 
effective mechanism to ensure uniform state enforcement of environ-
mental laws. 
C. Enforcement Problems Are Likely to Exist with Other 
Environmental Laws 
Since the federal supervision of other state environmental pro-
grams is similar to the supervisory structure established in the CWA, 
this study may indicate a wider problem with environmental protec-
tion than merely that which exists in the CWA. Although this Article 
only looked at state enforcement with respect to one part of the CWA, 
the causes of inconsistent enforcement suggest that the problem is 
widespread across much of the environmental spectrum where feder-
alism plays a significant role. 
Among the many federal-state dual enforcement schemes, only the 
NPDES program has summary reporting requirements such as the 
QNCRs.205 The other major environmental statutes do not even have 
reliable indicators to measure.206 It is not a stretch to hypothesize that 
even worse accountability in state enforcement would produce similar 
or even less effective state enforcement. 
Water Act); see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994) (describing "diligent prosecution" bar in the 
Clean Air Act). 
203 Cf Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1987) ("The bar 
on citizen suits when governmental enforcement is under way suggests that the citizen suit is 
meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action."). 
204 Cf Russo, supra note 154, at 231-32. 
205 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.45 (1996). 
206 The Clean Air Act requires permit information under Title V (1990 amendments), but this 
requirement has yet to be fully implemented. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661(a)-(t) (1994). The Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Information System (RCRIS) also has been criticized for poor 
information tracking in the hazardous waste context. See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Hazardous 
Waste: Benefits of EPA's Information System Are Limited, 6 (Aug. 1995). 
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In analyzing federalism in environmental laws since the 1970s, 
Hubert H. Humphrey III and LeRoy C. Paddock noted that the 
threat of the EPA withdrawing approval for any state enforcement 
programs and having the federal government assume primary re-
sponsibility was hollow due to a lack of federal resources and an 
expanding number of regulated entities.207 In order for federalism to 
be truly effective for any environmental program, the threat of EPA's 
ability to withdraw authority from a state must be strengthened 
across the board.208 In a recent case that analyzed a constitutional 
equal protection claim for selective enforcement of the CWA, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that limited funding forces state regulators 
"to make difficult, and often completely arbitrary decisions" in the 
effort to enforce federal laws and mandates.209 
A recent study of California's regulation of underground fuel tanks 
revealed that the lack of funds to enforce the law adequately had 
created a situation where enforcement was lax and inconsistent, fur-
ther weakening any attempts at voluntary compliance.210 The failure 
of such an approach is severe indeed. As described by the author: 
Because responsible parties often refuse to remediate their re-
leases, [Leaking Underground Fuel Tank (LUFT)] regulators be-
lieve it is "more efficient to move on to cases with cooperative 
tank owners rather than spend time with belligerent ones." This 
enforcement practice is facilitated by discretionary cleanup stand-
ards which can be applied by the field-level regulators on a case-
by-case basis without regard for the impact of such "front-line" 
decisions on overall enforcement success. It is precisely because 
of this disparate treatment that many UFT [or Underground Fuel 
Tank] owners and operators cite [San Francisco Regional Water 
Quality Control Board (SFRWQCB)] regulatory inconsistencies 
as one reason for their unwillingness to cooperate with the 
SFRWQCB.211 
There are other ominous signs that EPA's oversight of state en-
forcement is structurally ineffective across a wide range of programs. 
A GAO study indicates that the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
207 See Hubert H. Humphrey III & LeRoy C. Paddock, The Federal and State Roles in 
Environmental Enforcement: A Proposalfor a More Effective and More Efficient Relationship, 
14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 7, 8-9, 43-44 (1990). 
208 Cf id. ("[A] clear set of principles for allocating enforcement responsibilities ... should 
include ... EPA maintain[ing] a credible threat to withdraw authority from states whose 
implementation of federal programs is consistently inadequate."). 
209 See Futernick v. Sumpter Thwnship, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996). 
210 See Christen Carlson White, Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy 
of Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'y 105, 136-37 (1996). 
211 [d. at 137. 
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Information System (RCRIS), which was developed to assist the 
states and the federal government in tracking hazardous waste and 
managing the hazardous waste program, does not "provid[e] a mecha-
nism for maintaining highly reliable data."212 Similarly, a GAO report 
. has indicated that data quality in the Superfund program is also 
insufficient to implement the CWA effectively and efficiently.213 In the 
case of RCRIS, EPA took no steps to ensure that there was consistent 
data, or that conversion to the new system did not create many errors 
in terms of monitoring overall enforcement and state compliance.214 
With respect to the CWA implementation in Washington by the 
State Department of Ecology, People for Puget Sound indicated in 
1993 that lack of regular data made it impossible to quantify or even 
estimate total water quality violations.216 Overall, as stated by Joel 
Mintz, "[EPA's] enforcement information support systems were es-
tablished ... with little attention to data quality."216 
This pattern of having flawed or incomplete data systems or incom-
plete methods of tracking is a severe problem that calls into question 
EPA's ability and desire to really monitor whether pollution compli-
ance is occurring at the state level. In general, program evaluation is 
critical to studying the effectiveness of any policy implementation.217 
Without adequate program evaluation, it is impossible to tell if a 
program is working or not.218 Moreover, without effective or consis-
tent enforcement, there is little incentive for compliance. Therefore, 
tracking and enforcing compliance is necessary to bring about 
changes required by the law. 
Perhaps most discouraging for environmental protection, there has 
been increasing anecdotal evidence that many states may want to 
weaken their environmental laws deliberately. EPA has been alarmed 
by the rapid growth of so-called state audit shield laws which protect 
a polluter from prosecution when information indicating violations is 
gained from internal environmental auditing.219 Without the critical 
212 See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Hazardous Waste: Benefits of EPA's Information System Are 
Limited, 6 (Aug. 1995). 
213 See GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Superfund System Enhancements Could Improve the 
Efficiency of Cost Recovery, 6 (Aug. 1995). 
214 GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP., Hazardous Waste: Benefits of EPA's Information System Are 
Limited, 5--6 (Aug. 1995). 
216 See PEOPLE FOR PUGET SOUND, supra note 153. 
216 MINTZ, supra note 133, at 76. 
217 See ALICE RIVLIN, SYSTEMATIC THINKING FOR SOCIAL ACTION 141 (1971). 
218 See id. 
219 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Many States Give Polluting Firms New Protections, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at 1 (discussing Texas and other states). 
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step of state support for strong enforcement, and with the myriad 
other problems faced by states in enforcement, the weakness of fed-
eral oversight most certainly will doom the true and effective control 
of pollution in all of our jointly administered environmental laws. 
v. CONCLUSION 
On April 25, 1996, the Governor of Georgia signed new legislation 
imposing fines of $25,000 to $100,000 per day on Atlanta if the city 
failed to meet the construction deadlines designed to contain phospho-
rous pollution at the limit established in its NPDES permit.220 More 
importantly for a fast-growing, pro-development city such as Atlanta, 
the new legislation established a very strict sewer hook-up ban for 
any new development if Atlanta's combined sewer overflow facilities 
were not completed on schedule, or if Atlanta were not in compliance 
with its NPDES permitted phosphorous limit.221 The people of Geor-
gia had spoken. At least with respect to Atlanta, the state was willing 
to require strong agency enforcement, and was trying to make pro-
gress in actual cleanup of the polluted Chattahoochee River. Paradoxi-
cally, the passage of this legislation does not represent the effective-
ness of state intervention to restore stringent state enforcement. 
Instead, it shows how difficult it is to uniformly change state enforce-
ment of CWA standards. 
The legislation in this case was controversial and difficult to pass, 
and it only applied to one NPDES permit-that of Atlanta's municipal 
sewage treatment system.222 Although one general provision required 
a reduction of capacity for all non-compliance sewage treatment fa-
cilities, the state made no attempt to change how the Georgia EPD 
would enforce monetary or other penalties under the delegated 
CWA.223 Other Georgia cities still remain out of compliance with their 
NPDES permits with no threats likely to compel changes.224 Thus, 
despite a great hue and cry, very little actually has changed in Georgia 
with respect to strong enforcement of CW A standards. 
As previously recognized: 
The success of the complex regulatory scheme created by the 
Clean Water Act depends ultimately upon the effective enforce-
220 See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-23.2 (Michie 1996). 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See Region IV, EPA, GEORGIA Q. NON-COMPLIANCE REP. (covering periods Jan. 1, 1994-
June 1, 1995) (on file with the author). 
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ment of its various requirements. In recognition of this critical 
relationship and keenly aware that previous federal enforcement 
efforts had languished, Congress gave the EPA substantial power 
to exact compliance with the Act.225 
This study indicates that without the requirement of compliance 
from EPA, the states have not been uniformly complying with the 
CWA. Absent a change of priorities at the state level, a true change 
in state enforcement and thus control of pollution requires effective 
EPA intervention, in the form of a genuine threat of a federal take-
over. Without this threat, the nationwide goal of strong, uniform 
standards of environmental protection is a myth. Some states may do 
well; others will not. The presence of strong environmental standards 
in statutes alone will not compel consistent and effective environ-
mental protection. Georgia and many other states will be doomed to 
inferior enforcement of the CWA and possibly other environmental 
laws in a new race to the bottom. Without nationally enforced stand-
ards, the pristine landscape of effective environmental protection will 
be sullied forever by the dirty river of ineffective enforcement. 
226 Andreen, supra note 20, at 259--60. 
Appendix A 
Comparison of NPDES permitted major source non-compliance peri-
ods between the states of Washington and Georgia as reported in the 
QNCRs 
Data: In order to compare enforcement consistency, this study used 
data from the quarterly non-compliance reports (QNCRs) compiled 
by the regional EPA offices which show all violations of major per-
mitted sources and actions taken on a quarterly basis. Violations may 
be for an exceedance of pollutant levels or for administrative viola-
tions, such as failure to report or to enforce prohibitions. There were 
54 different possible pollutant violations, 80 possible reporting viola-
tions, and 3 possible enforcement violations. (See Appendix A-I). 
The original data consisted of 1) copies of QNCR reports for Geor-
gia NPDES permittees, prepared by the state of Georgia Department 
of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, for EPA's 
region IV office in Atlanta, for the six quarterly reporting periods 
spanning January 1, 1994 through June 1, 1995, and 2) copies of QNCR 
reports compiled by EPA's region X in Seattle for all states in Region 
X, for the five quarterly reporting periods spanning April 1, 1994 
through June 1, 1995. 
Information from this original data for the states of Washington and 
Georgia, consisting of permitted sources, types of violations, non-com-
pliance status, length of time out of compliance, resolution date or end 
of non-compliance period, state location, and status as a municipal or 
non-municipal source, was then entered into the SPSS system for 
windows, version 6.1, a statistical software package.1 The labels and 
headings for the various variables is reproduced in Appendix A-I. 
Spot checking of entry quality (100 entries) revealed no entry errors, 
giving a probability of data entry error for this study of between 0 
and 3%, at the 95 % confidence interval (using the graphical method 
1 SPss is a common software package used for the statistical manipulation of data in the social 
sciences arena. 
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for determining proportion distribution, Clopper and Pearson, 1934).2 
The numbers used to represent the various violations for the viola-
tions variable (VIOL) are defined in Appendix A-I. 
U sing the SPSS system, several statistical tests were conducted. 
The results of these tests, as they actually appear in the SPSS format, 
are reproduced in Appendices A-2 through A-7. 
The data from January 1, 1994 through June 1, 1995, revealed that 
the average length of non-compliance times in Georgia was 5.5 
months for all NPDES sources, 5.4 months for non-municipal NPDES 
sources, and 5.5 months for municipal NPDES sources. (See Appendix 
A-4.) In Washington, the average non-compliance period, based on the 
data from April 1, 1994 through June 1, 1995, was 3.6 months for all 
NPDES sources, 3.7 months for non-municipal NPDES sources, and 
3.5 months for municipal NPDES sources. (See Appendix A-4). 
If state non-compliance times are drawn from the same pool of 
equal non-compliant sources nationwide, it is to be expected that 
there would be no statistical difference in mean non-compliance times 
separated by state. A comparison of means of the average length of 
time of violations of sources was compared, depending on the state 
in which the sources were located. The tests used "equal" degrees 
of freedom for all means comparisons (since the distribution of the 
months of non-compliance should be similar for both). The probability 
that the difference in means from this comparison was random, if the 
data were drawn from the same data set of nationally uniform en-
forcement standards, was less than one in one billion. (See Appendix 
A-3). The same comparison was done while regressing out effects due 
to whether a source was municipal or non-municipal and effects due 
to the type of non-compliance violation, and the probability that the 
difference in these means was random from this comparison was also 
less than one in one billion. (See Appendix A-5). 
Interestingly, although there did not appear to be major differences 
in non-compliant times due to whether the source was municipal or 
non-municipal, some differences appeared to be caused by type of 
compliance violation. (See Appendices A-3 and A-5). Still, this distinc-
tion was nowhere near as important as the obvious differences based 
on state location of the source. (See Appendices A-2, A-3, and A-5). 
Washington does report more violations overall, but this may be due 
2 The graphical method allows a way to detennine confidence intervals with small sample sizes 
or with sampling which has a mean that is very close to the limits of the range (near 0 or 100%). 
See Wonnacott and Wonnacott, supra note 184, at 274. 
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to the much larger coastline and presence of more licensed sources. 
In any event, more violations reported suggest more licensed sources 
and more vigorous enforcement, supporting the thesis of the paper. 
Moreover, a much larger number of Washington's violations are re-
porting violations (1182 out of 1243 vs. 78 out of 133 for Georgia), 
further indicating a focus on enforcement. (See Appendices A -6 and 
A-7). The presence of such a significant number of reporting viola-
tions, primarily in the state of Washington, suggests that the differ-
ence in perecentages of violations that are reporting violations could 
be having an effect on the results. 
In order to test the differences in non-compliance when reporting 
violations are excluded, a new variable was created, MOS.NCl, which 
showed months out of compliance only for pollutant violations. In this 
comparison, the number of violations in both states was almost equal, 
with Georgia having 55 pollutant source violations and Washington 
having 61. (See Appendix A-6). The mean non-compliance time for the 
pollutant violations was still higher for Georgia with an average of 6.0 
months out of compliance vs. an average of 4.3 months out of compli-
ance for the state of Washington. (See Appendix A-5). The difference 
between the two averages was still statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level, with only a 4.2% chance that the difference in the 
averages were due to random variations. (See Appendix A-7). 
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Appendix A-I 
COLUMN HEADINGS USED IN SPSS FORMAT FOR DATA MA-
NIPULATION 
A- REPORTING PERIOD 
B- FACILITY NAME 
C-STATE (LOC): GEORGIA-l WASH-2 
D-STATUS AS MUNICIPAL OR NON-MUNICIPAL SOURCE 
(M_I): MUNICIPAL-l NON-MUNICIPAL-2 
E-VIOLATION (VIOL) (AS LISTED BEGINNING ON THE 
NEXT PAGE) 
F-VIOLATION DATE 
G-END DATE FOR REPORTING PERIOD 
H- # MONTHS NONCOMPLIANCE (MOS.NC) 
1- BAN DATE-SEWER BAN IMPOSED 
J- MONTHS OUT OF COMPLIANCE FOR POLLUTION VIOLA-
TIONS ONLY (MOS.NCl) 
TYPES OF NONCOMPLIANCE 
CONSTITUENTS, GA & WA, MUNINON 
ALL EFFLUENT 1 
BOD,5-DAY 2 
CHLORINE, TOTAL RESID. 3 
COLIFORM, FECAL 4 
NITROGEN, AMMONIA 5 
SOLIDS, FLOATING, VIS DET 6 
SOLIDS, SETTLEABLE 7 
SOLIDS, SUSP % REMOVAL 8 
SOLIDS, TOTAL SUSPD 9 
ALKALINITY, TOTAL 10 
ALUMINUM 11 
ANTIMONY, TOTAL 12 
ARSENIC, TOTAL RECOV. 13 
BENZO(A)PYRENE 14 
BIOASSAY 15 
BORON, DISSOLVED 16 
CADMIUM, TOTAL RECOV 17 
CARBON TETRACHLORIDE 18 
CHROMIUM, TOTAL RECOV 19 
CHROMIUM, HEXAVALENT 20 
CHLOROFORM 21 
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COPPER, TOTAL RECOV 22 
CYANIDE, FREE (AMEN T CL) 23 
CYANIDE, TOTAL RECOV 24 
CYANIDE, WEAK ACID DISSOC 25 
DENSITYIWATER @20 DEG C 26 
DIELDRIN 27 
FLUORIDE 28 
FLOW, CONDUIT/THRU TRTMT 29 
HARDNESS M 
HYDROCARBONS, PETROL 31 
IRON 32 
LEAD, TOTAL RECOV 33 
MERCURY, TOTAL 34 
METHYLENE CHLORIDE 35 
NICKEL, TOTAL RECOV 36 
OIL & GREASE 37 
OUTFALL OBSERV, VISUAL 38 
OXYGEN DEMAND, CHEM 39 
OXYGEN, DISSOLVED 40 
PH 41 
PHENOL, SINGLE COMPD 42 
PHENOLICS 43 
PHOSPHORUS, TOTAL 44 
SELENIUM, TOTAL RECOV 45 
SILVER, TOTAL RECOV. 45 










ANALYTICAL METHODS 100 
COMMENCE MONITORING 101 
CONSTRUCTION SCHED 102 
DISCHARGE PREVENTION 103 
DMR OVERDUE 104 
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FAIL ENFORCE IND. PRETR 
OPER. LEVEL ATTAINED 
SEAFOOD PROD. EFFL. 
SLUDGE HANDLING 













SOLIDS, SUSP. % REMOVAL 
SOLIDS, TOTAL SUSPENDED 
CONDUIT FLOW 
NITROGEN 
OXYGEN, CARBON DEMAND 
BOD5 % REMOVAL 
OIL & GREASE VISUAL 





































































CARBON TETRACHLOR 155 







DISSOLVED OXYGEN 163 
ALKALINITY 164 
HARDNESS 165 
TOTAL DISSOLVE SOLIDS 166 
TOTAL NON-VOLATILE SOLIDS 167 
PETROLEUM HYDROCARB 168 
SELENIUM 169 
BERYLIUM 170 
RADIUM 226 171 
MANGANESE 172 





BIS (2ETHYL-HEXYL) PHTHALATE 178 
CHLORODIFLUOROMETHANE 179 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER VIOL 
BOD 5 DAY 200 
BOD 5 % REMOVAL 201 
TSS 202 
42 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:35 
Appendix A-2 
02 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
- - Description of SUbpopulations - -
Summaries of MOS.NC 
By levels of LOC 
Variable Value Label Mean Std Dev Cases 
For Entire Population 
LaC 
LaC 
Total Cases = 1668 
1.00 
2.00 








02 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
t-tests for Independent Samples of LOC 
Variable Number of Cases Mean 
MOS.NC 
LaC 1 133 5.4737 
LaC 2 1243 3.6010 




SE of Mean 
.395 
.042 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F=256.108 P= .000 
t-test for Equality of Means = 95% 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Sig SE of Diff CI for Diff 
Equal 10.30 1374 0.00 .182 (1.516, 2.229) 
Unequal 4.72 135.01 0.00 .397 (1.088, 2.657) 
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Appendix A-4 
02 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
- - Description of SUbpopulations - -
Summaries of MOS.NC 
By levels of LOC 
M_I Mil 
Variable Value Label 









Total Cases = 1668 
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Appendix A-5 
02 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION **** 
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data 
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable .. MOS.NC 
Block Number 1. Method: Enter LOC M_I VIOL 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
l..VIOL 
2 .. M_I MIl 
3 .. LOC 
Multiple R 
R Square 











Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Squares 
475.96483 
5400.62820 
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Appendix A-6 
03 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
- - Description of Subpopulations - -
Summaries of MOS.NC1 
By levels of LOC 
Variable Value Label 
For Entire PopUlation 
LOC 1.00 
LOC 2.00 
Total Cases = 1668 






03 May 96 SPSS for MS WINDOWS Release 6.1 
















Mean Difference = 1.7577 
6.0364 5.686 .767 
4.2787 3.332 .427 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 3.182 P= .077 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 
Equal 2.05 114 





SE of Diff CI for Diff 
.855 (.063,3.452) 
.877 (.013, 3.502) 
